Abstract. A (t, n)−secret sharing scheme is a method of distribution of information among n participants such that t > 1 can reconstruct the secret but t − 1 cannot. There is numerous research about secret sharing schemes. However there is little research on secret sharing schemes based on extension fields. In this paper, we study secret sharing schemes based on extension fields over finite fields. We use two methods to recover the secret. We define the access structure and the accessibility degree for these secret sharing schemes. We also describe our theorems, definitions and a corollary.
Introduction
Secret sharing has been a subject of study for over 30 years. A secret sharing scheme is a way of distributing a secret among a finite set of people such that only some distinguished subsets of these subsets can recover the secret. The collection of these special subsets is called the access structure of the scheme.
Secret sharing schemes were constructed by Shamir [11] and Blakley [1] in 1979. Shamir scheme was based on polynomial interpolation but was later shown by Mc Eliece and Sarwate to be an application of Massey scheme [8] , a scheme based on codes, to Reed Solomon codes [9] . Massey [8] used linear codes for secret sharing and explored the relationship between the access structure and the minimal codewords of the dual code of the underlying code in 1993.
Several authors has been studied on secret sharing schemes [3] , [4] , [7] , [8] . Secret sharing schemes were applied to various fields such as cloud computing, controlling, nuclear weapons in military, recovering information from multiple servers, and controlling access in banking system [5] .
Another secret sharing system is the (t, n)-threshold system [10] . A (t, n)-threshold scheme is a method of distribution of information among n participants such that t > 1 participants can reconstruct the secret but t − 1 cannot.
In this work, we present a (t, n)-threshold scheme based on extension fields over finite fields.
The material is organized as follows. Section II contains some algebraic background. Section III describes the schemes and analyses their security. We also determine the access structure of these secret sharing schemes and prove its properties. Section IV collects concluding remarks.
Algebraic preliminaries

Roots of irreducible polynomials
In this section, we remind some information about the set of roots of an irreducible polynomial over a finite field.
be an irreducible polynomial over a finite field F q and α be a root of f in extension field of F q . Then for a polynomial h ∈ F q [x] we have h(α)=0 if and only if f divides h [6] .
Furthermore, all the roots of f are simple and are given by the m distinct elements α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 of F q m [6] .
Then the splitting field of f over F q is given by F q m [6] . Definition 1. Let F q m be an extension of F q and let α ∈ F q m . Then the elements α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 are called the conjugates of α with respect to F q [6] .
The conjugates of α ∈ F q m with respect to F q are distinct if and only if minimal polynomial of α over F q has degree m. Otherwise, the degree d of this polynomial is a proper divisor of m and then the conjugates of α with respect to F q are the distinct elements α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q d−1 each repeated m/d times.
Theorem 2. The conjugates of α ∈ F q * with respect to any subfield of F q have the same order in the group F q * , where F q * is a cyclic group of nonzero elements of which consists of nonzero elements of F q [6] .
Corollary 2. If α is a primitive element of F q , then so are all its conjugates with respect to any subfield of F q [6] .
Traces and norms
In this part, we consider the viewpoint of regarding a finite extension F = F q m of the finite field K = F q as a vector space over K.
If K is the prime subfield of F , then T r F/K (α) is called the absolute trace of α and simply denoted by T r F (α) [6] .
Definition of the trace may be obtained as follows.
be the minimal polynomial of α over K and its degree d is a divisor of
is called the characteristic polynomial of α over K. By Theorem 1, the roots of f in F are given by α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q d−1 and by Definition 1, the roots of g in F are precisely the conjugates of α with respect to K. Hence
and a comparison of coefficients shows that
Moreover, by comparing the constant terms in (1), it can be written the following equation:
The number of distinct bases of F over K is too large, but there are two special types of bases . The first base is a polynomial basis {1, α, α 2 , ..., α m−1 }, made up of the powers of a defining element α of F over K, where α is taken to be a primitive element of F . Another type of basis is a normal basis. Definition 4. Let K = F q and F = F q m . Then a basis of F over K of the form {α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 }, consisting of a suitable element α ∈ F and its conjugates with respect to K, is called a normal basis of F over K [6] .
Secret sharing schemes
In this section we should think about a case of some malicious behaviors lying among participants which are called cheaters. They modify their shares in order to cheat.
If a group of participants can recover the secret by combining their shares, then any group of participants containing this group can also recover the secret.
Definition 5. An access group is a subset of a set of participants that can recover the secret from its shares. A collection Γ of access groups of participants is called an access structure of the scheme. An element A ∈ Γ is called a minimal access element. Hence a set is a minimal access group if it can recover the secret but no proper subset can recover the secret. LetΓ be the set of all minimal access elements.
We callΓ the minimal access structure [5] . Determining the minimal access structure is a hard problem [3] . Now let us consider the accessibility of an access structure of secret sharing scheme based on binary linear code. Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P m } be a set of m participants and let A p be the set of all access elements on P .
Definition 6. The accessibility index on P is the map δ p (Γ): A p → R given by
for Γ ∈ A p , where m = |P |. The number δ p (Γ) will be called the accessibility degree of structure Γ [2] .
The Schemes
In this section, we present the new (t, n)− threshold schemes that combine of Shamir scheme with our schemes.
First scheme
Let F q be the secret space and F q m be the sharing space. We consider a finite extension of F q m of the finite field F q as a vector space over F q , where m is the dimensional of F q m over F q . Assume a characteristic polynomial g(x) of α, where α ∈ F q m and the degree of g(x) is m such that
• Let all of elements of F q m , except 0, be the participants.
• The dealer pics the element −a m−1 ∈ F q as the secret and distributes to m elements of F q m which are α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 .
We know that these elements are also the normal basis elements of F q m and uniquely determined and each element of F q m can be written as the linear combination of basis elements. These m participants recover the secret while pooling their shares. In the first scheme, we need the trace function of α to recover the secret.
We also know that T r F/K (α) is also equal to −a m−1 , where −a m−1 is the coefficient of x m−1 for the characteristic polynomial g(x). So α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 elements can reach the secret together.
Second scheme
Now we construct another scheme using the norm function. In this scheme the dealer pics the element (−1) m .a 0 ∈ F q as the secret and distributes to the m elements of F q m which are α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 . These m participants recover the secret while combining their shares as follows.
We know that N F/K (α) is also equal to (−1) m a 0 . So α, α q , α q 2 , ..., α q m−1 elements can reach the secret together.
If m − h say, with 1 ≤ h < m, participants group together they can guess the secret with probability
Another possible attack would be to isolate elements of F q m which are reached the secret. In our secret sharing schemes, only the conjugates of α with respect to F q can recover the secret. These elements are also the normal basis elements which are uniquely determined.
Theorem 3. In these secret sharing schemes based on extension fields we have the following. i) The access structure consists of the m elements. ii) No element of number less than m can be used in recovering the secret.
Proof. i) The secret is recovered thanks to the normal basis elements and their number is m. ii) These m elements are uniquely determined. So there is no element which has this property. The proof is clear. Definition 7. The access structure of these secret sharing schemes is given by
Theorem 4. The number of parties in these secret sharing schemes is q m − 1 and the access structure has the following properties: i) Only m elements can be used to recover the secret but (m − 1) cannot. ii) When the parties come together, up to [ The accessibility degree of the access structure for these secret sharing schemes based on extension fields over finite fields can be defined as follows.
Definition 8. The accessibility index on P is the map δ p (Γ):A p → R given by
for Γ ∈ A p , where m = |P | is the number of participants in the access structure. The number δ p (Γ) will be called the accessibility degree of structure Γ. Example 1. Let F 2 3 be the secret sharing space. This space is also m−dimensional vector space over F 2 . Consider the polynomial f (x) = x 3 + x 2 + 1 ∈ F 2 [x]. The coefficients of polynomial are a 0 = 1, a 1 = 1, a 2 = 1. So the secret is −a 2 = −1 = 1 and m = 3, q = 2. The normal basis elements of F q m are α, α 2 , α 2 3−1 = α 4 . It is clear that
All the sharings are K 1 = (α 0 , 1), K 2 = (α 1 , α), K 3 = (α 2 , α 2 ), K 4 = (α 3 , α 2 + 1), K 5 = (α 4 , α 2 + α + 1), K 6 = (α 6 , α 2 + α), K 7 = (α 7 , 1). K 2 , K 3 and K 5 participants recover the secret while combining their shares by using the trace function of α as follows.
T r F/K (α) = α + α 2 + α 4 = α + α 2 + (α 2 + α + 1) = 1.
Now we assume that the secret is (−1) 3 .a 0 = (−1).1 = −1 = 1 and the same participants recover the secret calculating the norm of α as follows. As it is seen that both of these schemes are the (3, 7)−threshold schemes. The accessibility degree of the access structure is 
Conclusion
In the present article we constructed some (t, n)−threshold schemes using the trace and norm functions. These schemes are mainly based on finite extensions over finite fields.
